Difesa: l’intervento del Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa all’Italian Air Force AeroSpace Power Conference 2023
di Report Difesa (redazione)
ROMA. Si è aperta, oggi a Roma, la due giorni dedicata all’AeroSpace Power.
Sarà esaminato il potere aerospaziale sia dal punto di vista industriale, che militare.
Pubblichiamo il discorso integrale (in inglese) del Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa Ammiraglio Giuseppe Cavo Dragone.
“Authorities, kind guests, good morning!
Thank you all for your participation, which gives prestige to this important conference.
Minister, once again thank you from all the members of the Armed Forces for your presence and tangible attention to us, today as in all circumstances.
Within the initiatives promoted to celebrate the centenary of our Air Force, the 2023 Aerospace Power Conference provides a qualified and significant opportunity for meeting experts at a global level. This forum brings together the public and private sectors, the military and the civil spheres to confront each other in two domains, the air and space domains, which, thanks to the significant technological developments of the last two decades, are increasingly connected and have less and less clear-cut boundaries.
I greet Lieutenant General Luca Goretti and I thank him for this important opportunity for reflection and for this well-structured and stimulating event, also in terms of its contents.
My greetings and thanks to the speakers who, with the depth of their speeches, will contribute to providing useful insights that, I am sure, we will be able to take advantage of making Defence increasingly joint and capable of operating with a multi-domain approach and in an effective and coordinated manner.
Geostrategic Context and Aerospace
The Ukrainian crisis has once again shown that the capabilities and abilities to operate in the air and space domains are inescapable conditions to carry out any military activity effectively. In particular, it is evident to all how the space domain, together with the cyber domain, were the first to be exploited in operations aimed at enabling the effects of the classical domains (land, sea and air), amplifying their reach or reducing the adversary effectiveness.
Moreover, it has become evident that Russia’s lack of air superiority – that is their glaring difficulties to penetrate the Ukrainian air space due to the presence of air defence systems – has deprived Russia of the main characteristics of air power, such as precision, quickness and persistence.
This perspective, considering the development of increasingly sophisticated A2AD systems by our potential opponents, highlights the need to reflect on how and in which capabilities we should invest in to maintain our operational air deterrence. I can see an answer to this question in our ability to grasp the blurred boundary between sky and space but, above all, in our ability to achieve a stronger overlapping of air power with space and cyber, in synergy and coordination with other domains, through a joint systemic approach aiming to display actual and effective multi-domain capabilities.
The Ukrainian crisis has also confirmed the effectiveness of our cooperative approach based on alliances. NATO and the EU have responded promptly, showing unity and determination.
As to the capability support provided to Ukraine, we have noted very diverse weapon systems in terms of origin and technological generation, which once again shows the need to adopt “open” defence systems.
Therefore, in order to minimise technological gaps and then maximise the benefits of coalition operations, the first question to ask is how to manage the complexity of operations that will integrate very different operational and technological standards. In brief, we need to define the standards to be adopted to facilitate tomorrow’s maximum interoperability.
The challenge will not only be technological – i.e., in aeronautical terms, operating legacy assets with 5th and 6th generation assets – but also operational and procedural.
The centrality of aerospace
While the conflicts in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East had already shown how the ‘military’ use of space had become essential for the conduct of warfare, so much so as to speak of a ‘space-enabled war’, today this concept has reached a decidedly higher level.
The increased transversality and centrality of the space domain as an enabler for other ‘terrestrial’ activities makes it an increasingly attractive target for reducing the capabilities of the adversary, where the weak points of the architecture are not sufficiently protected. This risk calls for reflection on the need to equip the space infrastructure as a whole with passive and active defence capabilities, also aimed at countering the cyber threat.
In fact, it is undeniable that the future dependence of modern societies on aerospace infrastructures, also fuelled by the development of the space economy, entails new challenges for national security, particularly when linked to the use of satellite systems, which today can be denied through kinetic and non-kinetic operations.
Therefore, we cannot be blind to the reality of a space that is increasingly strategic and more competitive, but also more congested and, above all, contested.
A new approach to innovation
In a very short space of time, new technologies have blurred the demarcation between the various operational domains, expanding their physical boundaries while reducing action/reaction times.
The central theme is speed, not only of action, but also, and above all, of adaptation. This becomes more evident when one considers the speed with which today’s technologies are developing in the civil world compared to the military one, reversing the paradigm that existed until not so many years ago.
This is evidence that must necessarily encourage us to think about, above all, the need to enhance in the best possible way the civil-military combination, making our systems permeable and immediately integrable with civilian capabilities, similarly to what is happening in Ukraine with commercial unmanned aircraft. Experimental components should quickly be introduced and constantly improved thanks to feedback provided by users through structured procedures.
We will therefore need to focus on systems that are ‘open’ starting from the design phase and ready to be rapidly integrated, able to share as much information as possible with a multiplicity of actors, civil and military, national and international. This increases the complexity of Defence’s innovation path, which is increasingly influenced by the frenetic evolution of technologies capable of introducing disruptive innovations in systems, so much so that they represent real game changers, which the sector must embrace and deploy quickly.
The interaction with industry
It will therefore be essential to stay abreast, indeed, to anticipate technological development, knowing that, in order to do so, business risks may increase.
This approach will inevitably involve the relationship with industry, which will need to adjust to a systemic approach and be structured in an innovative manner, making the most of all the valuable expertise at our disposal. Procedures that the Ukrainian conflict has shown to be outdated will have to be upgraded. The just-in-time approach is to be replaced by a traditional logistic footprint of ‘pre-positioning’ in areas of pre-eminent interest, ensuring sustainability and adequate stock levels.
Hence, we need to make full use of Defence’s industrial policy adjusting it to the evidence gathered in current theatres. This probably implies changing our approach, perhaps reaching a point of convergence where the industry makes more armaments and weapons while sharing the risk (or the luck) to store them in our respective depots. But that too is readiness, it is deterrence!
We know that the safeguarding of strategic priorities requires our countries to make ever-greater efforts and, I would like to emphasise, it is in our best interest, as well as our duty, to proceed in that direction. A direction, moreover, clearly shared and indicated by the international community.
It is necessary for like-minded countries to work even more closely and collaborate. Loyal collaboration that aims at a world consciously projected towards the space frontier, where access to resources is no longer a factor of conflict but rather an additional reason to consolidate strategic synergies and a shared vision.
Our credibility and space defence capability define the battlefield on which the game for peace and stability is played.
Italy, the third country in the world [after the United States and the former Soviet Union] to put into orbit [in 1964] an entirely domestically made artificial satellite, the second European country for in-orbit assets and the third for investment in the sector, aims to confirm its role and expertise in this strategic field. As Defence, we will continue to do our part, investing in the operational, scientific and technological frontier that is opening up, to ensure resilience for Italy, thus protecting national interests.
I would like to thank the men and women of our Air Force, professionals who can reach for the stars but with their feet firmly on the ground. With their drive for innovation, they continue to set an international benchmark.
While confirming the centrality of aerospace for Defence and for Italy, a sector where we intend to keep on playing a leading role and seek cooperation and exchange with international organizations as well as public and private stakeholders, I would like to thank again all guests, organisers and participants”.
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